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Exploitation of the sea, as a source of food and mineral wealth,
is assuming an ever-increasing importance in the commercial and
political relations of nations. Against a backdrop of greater need
and incentive for exploiting the resources of the oceans, however,
there has been no development of a stable concensus of international legal opinion to govern the interaction of sovereign governments, as well as private interests, each pursuing its own perceived
goals for developing and harvesting its sea resources. To this
must also be added the conflicting approaches taken to those noneconomic functions which nations ascribe to the sea: conservation
("genuine," as opposed to mere attempts to monopolize resources
for one's own nationals), and providing a buffer zone viewed as
essential for both national security and the enforcement of revenue
and criminal laws.
Contemporary conferences attempting to resolve these differences by delineating the international law of the sea, regulating
the exploitation of the resources of the seas, the continental shelves,
and the seabed, coupled with the declarations and acts of various
nations proclaiming 200-mile limits, exclusive jurisdiction over the
continental shelf, "freedom of the seas," and pollution control
jurisdiction, graphically illustrate the centuries-old conflict between
the concepts of mare liberum and mare clausum.
The Three-Mile Limit of Territorial Seas represents an ambitious
undertaking: the tracing of the development, preeminence, and decline of a rule of international law limiting the jurisdiction of a
littoral state to 3 miles from shore. Its usefulness extends beyond
consideration of the 3-mile rule, however, because Captain Swarztrauber approaches his history of that rule through an analysis of
the underlying concept of national sovereignty over the seas, or
maritime territoriality.
Explaining at the outset that the doctrines of mare clausum and
mare liberum, while seemingly conceptually opposed, are merely
different methods by which states exercise control over the oceans1
(the latter being crude while the former is more subtle) the author
traces the influence that each concept has had on the practices
1 SWARZTRAUBER,

THE THREE-MILE LIMIT OF TERRITORIAL SEAS 1.
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of nations from the Roman view that state jurisdiction stopped at
the high-water mark,2 to the ostensible attempts of 15th century
Spain and Portugal to divide the world in half (including outright ownership of the high seas),3 to the Pax Brittanica's staunch
upholding of the 3-mile limit and freedom of the seas, 4 and finally
to contemporary claims of sovereignty over vast reaches of hitherto
high seas.5
The author generally follows a chronological pattern irt his
treatment of the 3-mile limit. He begins by considering ancient
and medieval practices then moves on to deal with three predecessors of the 3-mile rule: the famed "cannon-shot" rule, line-of-sight
doctrine, and the marine league. Captain Swarztrauber next
traces the ascendancy of the 3-mile limit from the 18th through
the 19th and into the early part of the 20th century. He is also
careful, however, to document major departures from the rule,
dissents to it, and competing views and practices. This is followed
by a consideration of the effect of World War II on the rule, after
which the author examines the post-war controversy over the extent of territorial seas, the role of the United Nations in that controversy, and the demise of the 3-mile rule.
Throughout his book, Captain Swarztrauber describes and contrasts theory, the works of publicists, and so forth, with the actual
practice of states as manifested in their decrees, statutes, treaties,
and court decisions. He points out that the 3-mile limit became
an accepted rule of international law mainly because its chief
backer, Great Britain, was a great power with the will and strength
to impose it upon lesser nations by neither recognizing nor submitting to other nations' attempts to enlarge their jurisdiction beyond 3 miles and also by scrupulously adhering to the rule itself.
The author shows that when Great Britain's successor, the
United States, equivocated with respect to the rule, the long
dormant claims to greater expanses of sea were revived and the
current regime of conflicting claims was begun.
Captain Swarztrauber concludes his description of the present
anarchy with what he terms, "a formula for reform." He maintains that to turn back the tide of extensive unilateral claims to
exclusivity would require a whole-hearted joint effort on the part

2 Id. at 10.
3 Id. at 13.
4

Id.

5 Id.

at

64.

at 164.
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of the United States and the Soviet Union, the two contemporary
naval powers which, acting in conjunction with one another, might
bring a measure of order to the current scene in much the same
way that Great Britain did a century ago. He then adds that
stability requires a single multi-purpose limit, pointing to the relative stability which was maintained under the 3-mile rule until
states started claiming special purpose jurisdiction beyond that
limit. He proposes that the 12-mile limit presents the most politically feasible successor to the 3-mile limit, given, of course, great
power cooperation in its sponsorship and advocacy.
The Three-Mile Limit of Territorial Seas provides a wealth of
historical material for the reader desirous of preparing himself for
a thorough understanding of the complex issues facing contemporary negotiators. In addition, it contains probably the most extensive bibliography ever compiled on the subject of territorial claims
over the ocean.
As citizens of the world's most highly industrialized nation,
we Americans have a vital stake in maintaining the freedom of the
seas for private commercial exploitation. The fruition of current
trends, either to divide up the high seas among littoral states for
their exclusive use or to place the seas under a kind of quasiworld (presumably via the U.N.) sovereignty, with developers being
required to pay licensing fees which would in large part accrue
to the benefit of non-littoral lesser developed nations with no
stake whatsoever in the risks associated with the venture, would
be a detriment to the exploration incentives which must be present
if the high costs of exploitation are to be surmounted and the
sea's resources tapped for the benefit of all mankind. All those
interested in preserving a regime of freedom with respect to the
oceans would do well to study Captain Swarztrauber's book.
JOHN
*

E.

CODREA*

The reviewer is a member of the Ohio Bar and currently a Law Clerk for

the Ohio Court of Appeals, Ninth Appellate District.
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TO NATIONAL JURISDICTION OF THE SEA.
Edited by George
T. Yates, III, and John Hardin Young. Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia. 1974. Pp. 236. $15.00.
LIMITS

This volume focuses upon the vexing problem of national
jurisdiction over the continental shelf and seabed. It is composed
of six essays dealing with three broad themes: a) jurisdiction over
the continental shelf; b) jurisdiction over the seabed; and, c) the
national practices of the Soviet Union and Canada.
Development of a rational test for defining national control
over both continental shelf and seabed is of crucial importance
today.
Economic considerations such as availability of large
supplies of offshore oil and deposits of crucial minerals make a
just definition of national jurisdiction a necessity. The choice of
an arbitrary marker such as the 200-meter isobath depth limit as
opposed to a more flexible method such as exploitable reaches can
change the contours of boundaries. The subject is technical in
that there are numerous proposed definitions of what the continental shelf is and the extent to which the coastal states may
exert control over it. The ultimate impact of the various proposals does not work very much change upon the areas which would
fall under the control of the states with the greatest coastlines
such as the United States or the Soviet Union. However, employment of the American proposal of 200-meter isobaths or some
other formulation based on exploitability or adjacency can very
much alter the territorial limits of various island states and states
with less extensive coast lines than the United States, Canada,
the Soviet Union, or Brazil. An exploitability limit would, for
example, greatly favor Iceland, while the 200-meter isobath proposal would not.
That the alternatives are still broad is fairly evident. The
areas where the different systems for boundary determination
come under the stress of actual testing are places such as the North
Sea or the South China Sea. In the North Sea Continental Shelf
Cases, the International Court of Justice began to work out the
boundaries of the North Sea States assuming that the States were
under a duty to negotiate and that each State should be awarded
a "just and equitable share of the divisible area."
The Court
rejected the notion that the States were participating in a division
of commonly owned property. Rather, the Court assumed that it
was defining the extent of territory already appurtenant to that
State. It was thus a problem of delimitation of the boundaries
of the States. The Court then held that the proper manner for
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defining the boundaries of the continental shelf was not to be
based on distributive principles nor was it for the unfettered
appreciation of the parties.
The ultimate outcome of the case was a negotiated North
Sea settlement on the basis of general principles laid down by
the Court. The settlement was an attempt to allocate the territory which constituted a natural extension of its land mass.
Another area in which the issue of national jurisdiction over
the seabed may arise is the South China Sea. It is bordered by
Brunei, the Republic of China, the Philippines, Malayasia, Indonesia, Vietnam, and the Peoples Republic of China. The issue
of control is serious because the shelf of the South China Sea is
thought to be rich in petroleum deposits. There is, as yet, no
definite method of delimiting the seabed boundaries of the South
China Sea. Compared to the North Sea, for example, it is
deeper, bordered by seven states and dotted with islands. Much
of the problem depends on the significance of such factors as
the location of various trenches and islands, and the principle
chosen for boundary creation. The states bordering the South
China Sea probably have sovereign rights to enjoy the mineral
wealth which lies beneath the surface of the continental shelf.
That is where certainty ends, because there has been no agreement between the states concerned as to common principles.
Determination of rights of national sovereignty is much less
complex when a state does not share a significant coastline with
other states or border on some common body of water. For
example, Canadian jurisdiction over much of the Arctic Sea is not
open to question. The real issues and problems are the extent to
which Canada wishes to exercise its jurisdiction for the purposes
of both extraction of minerals and environmental self-protection.
Canada's problem is to define her control in such a way as to
leave room for legitimate international uses of the Arctic and,
simultaneously, to protect Canadian interests in an area where
precise geographical information does not exist. Thus, Canada
extended its territorial limits to 12 miles. She also has taken legislative action to protect her Arctic waters from pollution as far as
100 miles offshore. Although controversial, there appear to be
grounds in Article 51 of the U.N. Charter for applying the antipollution legislation to both Canadian and foreign vessels.
It is important to remember that there are well over 100 states
with some coast line. The evolution of rational means of dividing
the control of continental shelf territory can be of immense significance to them. That is especially so for those states grouped
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around such masses as the South China Sea or the Persian Gulf,
where the economic consequences are likely to be great. It is of
less significance to the Soviet Union, Canada, and the United
States. It is possible to analyze the significance of the different
proposed systems of division by geographical position, that is,
whether a state is land locked, shelf locked, and those which are
unaffected by those classifications. Much will ultimately depend
on whether the issues involved are resolved in favor of maximally
large allocations to the various states or whether the largest possible bloc of territory is preserved under an international regime.
Limits to National Jurisdiction of the Sea is a collection of six
essays by leading authorities. Taken as a whole, it seems to be
oriented for the specialist rather than the lay reader. It is a
brief work, with the result that it focuses narrowly on the evolution of doctrine and practices connected with national control
of undersea resources. As it develops little of the necessary background material, it would appear that it is meant as a reference
tool and summary of developments for those already working in
the subject area rather than as a guide for the interested nonspecialist lawyer or layman.
WILLIAM

INTERNATIONAL

RELATIONS

AND

THE

FUTURE

OF

A.

OCEAN

GERBER

SPACE.

Edited by Robert G. Wirsing. Columbia, South Carolina: University of South Carolina Press (1974). Pp. 141. $5.95.
The concept of "freedom of the seas" has endured well into the
Twentieth Century, and it has only been in the recent past that
international attention has been focused upon the sea as a possible extension of national sovereignty rather than a mere liquid
barrier between land masses. This new awareness of the potential use of ocean space has brodght with it a new awareness of
the inadequacy of man's institutions in dealing with international
conflicts over the direction and means of the new use of ocean
space. Professor Robert G. Wirsing has collected and edited
papers delivered at the 1972 Institute of International Studies
conference on the Future of Ocean Space which deal with these
new problems in the formation and implementation of national
ocean space policy.
A basic and undisputed premise is that the old rules of international relations, based on sovereignty over land masses, are
inadequate in establishing policies and standards for disputes in-
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volving ocean space.
A majos decision currently facing the
United Nations is whether ocean space is to be partitioned between nations, and if so, what process is to be used in carrying
out the partition. International debate over division and control
of ocean space continues, leading many to question whether
there even exists a proper forum for the resolution of differences.
Each nation carries to the debate its own national policy on
use of ocean space, comprised of one or more special interests.
Mr. H. Gary Knight, in. his essay "Special Domestic Interests
and United States Policy," takes a critical look at the role of the
military, petroleum and natural gas industries, the fishing industry, the scientific community, the mineral mining industry, the
transportation industry, and the environmentalists in the formulation of United States ocean policy. The roots of national ocean
policy date from 1967 when the United Nations first addressed
the issue. Between 1967 and 1970, when the United States submitted its first draft treaties to the U.N. Seabed Committee, the
current U.S. policy developed and evolved. Mr. Knight's most
severe criticism of U.S. policy is reserved for the procedure used
to obtain input by special interests into this policy-making process. With the exception of the Department of Defense, no special
interest group was allowed input during the policy formulation
stage. The other groups were assigned the role of review and
critique of first drafts of various position papers. By emphasizing this review role for special interests, the Department of State
has reduced their significance. Even after creation of the Advisory Committee on the Law of the Sea in 1972, meaningful
access to the policy formation process was effectively denied these
special interests due to the withholding of vital information as a
result of security classifications. If decision-making improves with
full, free and honest discussion of all responsible interests and points
of view, immediate participation in the policy-making process by
all special interest groups is vital.
The substantive impact of individual special interest groups
with conflicting needs has varied considerably. The military's
desire for narrow territorial seas and free access through international straits, in order to facilitate free, undetected movement
of subsurface naval vessels, has been fully met by ocean space
policies advocated by the United States.
Petroleum industry
needs for extended national jurisdiction over off-shore mineral
deposits has also been advocated in U.S. policy. Unfortunately,
Mr. Knight, in criticizing petroleum industry rhetoric of the "energy crisis" as a pure smoke-screen for short-term industry profit
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motives, fails to consider that industry and national interests may
coincide in a common objective. Internal differences within the
fishing industry, with coastal fishermen advocating expanded
territorial seas to protect the fisheries, and deep water fishermen
advocating narrow limits to facilitate freedom of movement, may
have rendered the industry virtually ineffective as a source of input into U.S. policy-making. The desire of the scientific community for maximum access to all possible ocean areas for purposes of testing and experimenting has encountered strong
opposition from developing nations, and the relative unimportance
of the scientific interest in terms of short-term economic impact
may be the reason for a basic neglect of these interests in U.S.
policy. The mineral mining industry has had a more noticeable impact on U.S. policy. This impact was not due to input at the Department of State, but rather to an intensive legislative lobbying
effort which resulted in legislation to protect deep-sea mining from
competing claims. This type of legislation may be nothing more
than an appropriation of mineral resources by technologically advanced nations, forcing the developing nations to press claims for a
200-mile territorial sea, and hampering future efforts to resolve
differences in the U.N. Other special interest groups have met
with success in having their interests adopted as U.S. policy in almost direct proportion to the coincidence of their interests with
those of the Department of Defense. The transportation industry,
needing unlimited movement upon the seas, has been successful.
The environmentalists' desire to expand coastal state jurisdiction
for an international agreement to control pollution, has not been
expressed in U.S. policy. The sum total of all different special
interests may equal the national interest expressed in ocean policy,
but it is imperative that these needs be balanced in order to create
a workable national policy.
Mr. Robert L. Friedheim's essay, "A Law of the Sea Conference - Who Needs It?," is extremely prophetic in light of the
less than spectacular success of the recent conferences and provides an insight into the factors that contributed to the outcome of
the conferences. The mistaken reliance by nations upon a universal lawmaking conference to resolve the multiple problems of ocean
use was evident in the difficulties encountered by the U.N. Seabed Committee in developing an agenda in preparation for a Law of
the Sea Conference. The primary difficulties encountered were the
differences in theory and implementation that arose between the
"Group of 77" (a caucusing group of developing states) and the
developed nations. These differences arose in all subcommittees on
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issues of seabed regime, territorial seas, straits, fishing, ocean
science and environmental controls. As an historical comment,
Mr. Friedheim attributes this stalemate to the failure of the developed states to anticipate the demands and objections of developing nations, a failure which may be due, in part, to a misunderstanding of the nature of the U.N. as an institution.
The U.N. is a political institution which handles world problems in a political manner. The heart of the ocean problem is the
allocation of ocean resources, and a political approach demands
that each nation advance its individual and self-serving claims as
In this environment, the
to how allocation should take place.
claims of the developed states of altruistic motivation have met with
a skeptical reception from the developing nations. The General
Assembly is controlled by the developing nations, who dominate
in numbers but lack the present capacity for utilization of ocean
resources; thus, any General 'Assembly sponsored conference is
skewed in their favor. The issues that will receive serious attention in any such conference are those issues which are salient
to the majority. A substantive law of the sea is salient at this
time to the minority developed states because they are massive
users of the ocean. A law of the sea as a substantive standard
is only indirectly relevant to developing states whose primary concern is to harness ocean resources to aid in rapid economical development while preventing their use for the purpose of economic
gap between themselves and the developed nations. The developing nations view a law of the sea as a zero sum game - one in
which in order for one player to win, another must lose.
The nature of U.N. negotiations, in and of themselves, greatly
contributes to the futility of a search for solutions in a law of the
U.N. negotiations are a unique blend of parsea conference.
liamentary procedure and diplomatic formality. Diplomatic influences color negotiations on any issue with the concepts of state
sovereignty and sovereign equality, which raise the stakes and
decrease the possibility of compromise. Another factor contributing to the inadequacy of the U.N. as a forum for resolution of
ocean problems is the glaring lack of enforcement power over its solutions and conventions. A majority in the General Assembly may
reach a convention, but it is almost impossible to bind a dissenting nation unless the convention rule becomes part of customary
international law. Lack of enforcement power leads to reliance
upon consensus decisions. The inability to arrive at a consensus on
ocean problems has prevailed at recent conferences.
Mr. Friedheim, in anticipating the current situation, provides
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the reader with some cause for optimism. The current stalemate
in negotiations may, in effect, be a blessing in disguise. A stalemate has the advantage of allowing time for all parties to consider
their positions. It has the further advantage of allowing a measure of time to explore the possibility of a rival or supplemental
forum. An analysis of the U.N. shows that any ocean problem
taken before that body becomes a universal problem, with the U.N.
forced to arrive at a universal solution. The author proposes that
many ocean problems are regional in nature and therefore require
regional, not universal solutions. Transnational regional bargaining may provide a solution for these problems. Many of the issues
which have received bloc support from the developing nations
have originated at regional or idealogical conferences, and this
same medium may provide solutions for these issues. Unfortunately, Mr. Friedheim fails to concede the existence of universal
problems such as pollution of major oceans. Not all problems are
susceptible to regional solutions in that they require universal acceptance and cooperation in order to work. The author, in stating his case as a hard choice between futile efforts in an unwieldy
forum and international bargaining on a regional basis, does not
address the third alternative of reevaluation of national goals and
policies in light of long range world needs rather than short term
national needs. Selflessness has never been an attribute characterizing negotiations between sovereign states, but an extended
deadlock in the face of ever compounding ocean problems may
well prove intolerable to all nations.
In his short essay, "New Approaches to Control of Ocean
Resources," Mr. Lewis M. Alexander provides a concise and readable review of present jurisdictional control over ocean resources
and some workable alternatives worthy of serious consideration.
Mr. Alexander points out that the existence of two separate types
of ocean resources, living and nonliving, dictate separate approaches to control over both the coastal water column and the
seabed. Present national jurisdiction is based primarily on two
sources: codified international law found in the four Geneva Conventions of 1958, and customary international law as it has evolved
over the years. Generally, a nation exercises jurisdictional control
over a territorial sea, and sovereign rights for exploring and exploiting natural resources of its continental shelf, extending out to
the 200-meter isobath or beyond to where the depth of the water
allows for the exploitation of the natural resources. This last
exploitation limitation is technological rather than jurisdictional,
and actually makes possible resource exploitation by any coastal
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state that develops the technology to mine resources beyond depths
of 200 meters. This license to exploit, based upon advanced technology, is the primary motivation of developing nations in establishing a new ocean regime.
The author analyzes the conflicting objectives of developed
states that advocate freedom of the seas and developing states
that insist upon protection of resources. He foresees a universal
trend toward desired expansion of jurisdictional control over both
the water column and the seabed. A third faction comprised of
landlocked nations and nations with limited coastlines is also demanding a share of ocean resources, and strongly advocates the establishment of a world authority to control resource use and collect and distribute resource revenue.
As a compromise to these conflicting objectives, Dr. Arvid
Pardo of Malta proposed in the 1970 U.N. Draft Ocean Space
Treaty1 a 200 mile belt of ocean space for each coastal state, with
exclusive resource rights to the state within the 100-mile limit and
a mandatory contribution by the coastal state to an international
fund of a percentage of resources derived between 100 and 200
miles. Mr. Alexander feels that this is a simplistic approach to a
complex situation. Among the other alternatives, such as limiting
seabed jurisdiction to a certain depth, or to the edge of the continental shelf, he favors the United States' proposal for a limited
jurisdictional sea, with an intermediate seabed zone as a trusteeship area in which the coastal state receives preferential consideration in resource exploitation. Under this proposal, an international authority would control the use of resources beyond the
trusteeship area by dividing resources among all nations.
Mr. Alexander argues the absolute need for an international
authority to control some portion of ocean resources and distribute
income derived from their exploitation to the landlocked nations.
If the oceans of the world are truly a heritage of all mankind,
then a workable world solution to the resource allocation problem
may only be found in an equitable allocation between all nations.
The final essay, "A Regime For World Ocean Pollution Control," by E. W. Seabrook Hull and Albert Koers, deals with the
international aspects of ocean pollution and presents a framework
for creation of an international agency for pollution control. The
authors provide the reader with evidence to support the hypothesis that ocean pollution results from activities almost entirely under the control of individual nations. Among the pollutants analyzed are heavy metals such as mercury and lead, chlorinated
1 Draft Ocean Space Treaty, United Nations Doc. A/AC. 138/53 (1970).
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hydrocarbons such as pesticides, PCB and perchlorethylene,
petroleum, radionuclides, and thermal energy. The conclusion of
the analysis is: 1) pollution is a product of human economic activity; 2) that pollutants are carried to the oceans by natural means
such as through the atmosphere and by rivers; and, 3) pollutants
are generally not transmitted by direct human activity. A pragmatic approach to pollution control dictates an appreciation of scientific, economic, and political realities. The maximum "safe
level" of pollution which the atmosphere can absorb and still
maintain life can not be scientifically ascertained. Pollution is
correlated to economic activity, with the more highly developed
states being the more significant pollutors. The developing states,
realizing that the developed states were able to obtain their higher
economic status through unrestricted pollution, will oppose any
strict international pollution standard that would deprive them of
the same economic opportunity. Since pollution is an economic
activity, any political solution to the pollution problem will have
to utilize economics as the key mechanism of control.
Messrs. Hull and Koers have developed the concept of an "International Environment Protection Agency," which they vest with
the function of protection of international air and water. The
agency would consist of a General Conference, an Executive Board,
and an International Staff. The General Conference would not
use the "one nation, one vote" concept, but instead would rely on
weighted voting, with those nations having high populations, larger
land masses, and more economic activity having proportionately
more votes. The agency, through either the General Conference
or Executive Board, would establish standards in the form of
maximum tolerable limits of pollution on a universal basis. In
those areas where pollution is regional, the agency would encourage regional standards to be adopted by the concerned states.
The agency would also regulate the discharge of waste into the
high seas. The publicity given to the use of the oceans by the
United States as a dumping ground for containerized toxic material points to the immediate need for this type of control.
The basic principle upon which the agency would operate would
be that each state is individually responsible for pollution which
escapes its territorial boundaries. It would not interfere with the
internal pollution of a nation which does not have an effect beyond the state's boundaries. Each nation would also be responsible for any pollution produced outside of its national territory
which is the result of activities of nationals or activities subject to
its jurisdiction.
The establishment of standards and a regulatory mechanism
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would be a useless exercise unless the agency were given enforcement powers. Messrs. Hull and Koers recommend an enforcement power based upon a levy system. Offending states which exceed the maximum pollution standard would have a fine levied
against them. The exact amount of the levy would be based upon
the economic value realized from polluting, the degree to which the
state exceeded' the maximum levels, the length of time the excess
continued, and the per capita national product of the offending
states. This levy system would serve a two-fold purpose.
It
would remove the profit motivation from pollution, and, over
time, make pollution an economic liability. It would also place
higher penalties upon the developed states and consider the economic situation of developing states, making the entire plan more
palitable to them. Funds collected through the levy system would
be used to operate the agency and to assist in the economic development of these developing states.
Messrs. Hull and Koers present a serious and scholarly approach to what is perhaps the most pressing of all ocean problems.
They point out that the mechanism for pollution control need not
be placed in a new agency created especially for that purpose,
but could be given to the established world body. The authors
present only a sketchy framework of a new universal agency, the
mechanics and workability of which is undoubtedly subject to serious debate. However, their underlying premise - the need for
immediate and decisive action to control ocean pollution - is not
debatable.
International Relations and the Future of Ocean Space may serve
as a primer for the law of the sea novice whose interest has been
piqued by the recent conferences. Messrs. Alexander, Friedheim,
Hull, Knight, and Koers present the reader with an excellent array of primary source material on the difficulties of policy development, the conflicting interests, and the seeming inadequacy of existing institutions which, in the opinion of many observors, characterize the international allocation of ocean space. The scholar
may be disappointed by the lack of critical analysis of the continuing dialogue between nations on ocean space, or by Mr. Knight's
thinly veiled prejudices which are evidenced by his treatment of the
role of conflicting interest groups in shaping national policy.
However, this is neither a handbook of politics and diplomacy,
nor is it an exhaustive treatment of the impact of the petroleum
industry on U.S. policy. It is an excellent analysis of those basic
issues which must be resolved before a new law of the sea is
possible.
CHARLES W.

WHITNEY
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A STUDY OF FUTURE WORLDS. By Richard A. Falk. New York:
The Free Press (1975). Pp. 506. $15.00 Hardcover $3.95 Paperback.
This book is one in a series of volumes compiled by a transnational research enterprise, the World Order Models Project
(WOMP).
A Study of Future Worlds concerns it'self with examining possible world models in terms of their desirability and
attainability. At this point, a brief explanation of the substantive
content of the book is necessary to support the reviewer's final
conclusions concerning the value of this book and the group whose
basic ideas it sets forth.
The proposed world models center around four central values:
1) the minimization of large scale collective violence; 2) the
maximization of social and economic well-being; 3) the realization
of fundamental human rights and conditions of political justice;
4) the rehabilitation and maintenance of environmental quality,
including the conservation of resources. Varying states, of course,
tend to emphasize different values in their preferred world model,
depending on their stage of development, level of industrialization, relative economic wealth and stability and numerous other
factors. Mr. Falk focuses primarily on the world order proposed
by the United States members of WOMP.
Unlike many "utopia" writers, Mr. Falk. does not merely
describe a more desirable world order.
The transition steps
necessary to reach such a world-order system are also enumerated. The initial transition step described is re-education, with a
focus primarily on global concerns and nonaggression. Education
as to where the present state-oriented world system will ultimately lead is also necessary.
Mr. Falk asserts that this educational process will be undertaken not by governments, but by
marginal non-governmental groups. The process will progress to
control by regional centers in areas acceptable to primarily stateoriented governments. If the results of this progression are positive or the deterioration of the present system increases rapidly
(thereby making the need for such centers more apparent),
greater power and authority will be transferred to these organizations. The ultimate end of the gradual transition process will be
global institutions. State governments will continue in some form
to handle domestic affairs, subject to global policy and review,
and in cases of abuse, by the appropriate global institution. This
result will be realized through altered values. The transition
process does not include sudden drastic change accomplished
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through violence or coercion. Such a transition would be counterproductive in view of the four basic values to be attained.
Chapter Four is devoted to the organizational structure of a
central world government. Mr. Falk emphasizes that the structure is more a central guidance system than an actual world
government, and the preferred model will rely more heavily on a
buildup of roles of non-state actors and organizations and a shift
in orientation rather than a drastic reduction in the power of state
actors.
The final chapter explores the instrumental role the United
States could play in the implementation and realization of the
WOMP objective in its position as a world leader and one of
the world's wealthiest countries.
The brief description of the WOMP model given above is a
gross oversimplification of a convincing and well-researched plan.
The preferred model described is one designed to accomodate
the continual shifting of world priorities. Mr. Falk does not consider the United States' view of the WOMP model as being the
ultimate goal.
Once stability has been achieved, or at least,
when the more immediate objective of avoiding ecological or
man-induced catastrophe and repression has been achieved, attention can be turned more to the individual level and the shaping
of a society more conducive to the fulfillment of the personal
needs of its members.
When viewed objectively, doubts about the attainability of the
WOMP model center basically upon two factors. The first is
that the basic assumption is made that no global catastrophe will
occur before the year 2000. Such a catastrophe during the transition process would almost certainly result in a world order system,
developed prematurely due to necessity, that is not based on the
four values recognized as necessary to a permanent, workable
world-order system. Mr. Falk does not ignore or discount the
possibility that this could occur. He does discuss briefly alternative plans that could be implemented, mostly based on the "one
common enemy theory."
The second factor is one that is virtually unavoidable, considering the nature of this book. When
dealing with a future world-order system, projections based on
present trends are necessarily used as indicators.
Limitless
variables could alter such trends, invalidating normal projections.
Obviously, however, projections are not meant to be taken as
absolutes.
Mr. Falk emphasizes that he is not attempting to
predict the future.
He does not present one hard fast line of
development from which there can be no deviation. It is, rather,
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a flexible approach.
Mr. Falk is examining what is possible
and desirable, not predicting what will happen.
As one final comment, the reader will encounter a method
of thought that will almost certainly be foreign to his present
method of thinking. Concepts of nationality and the sovereign
state are so deeply embedded in most world inhabitants today
that a conscious effort to abandon them must be made by the
reader if he wishes to assess this book realistically and with an
open mind. Because the present system has existed so long and
is so deeply entrenched in the minds and consciousness of people
and governments alike, it is easy to dismiss as impossible any
alternate system, however reasonable and viable, that has as its
basis a global rather than state system.
This book deserves more than passing notice. It should not be
summarily dismissed. If for no other reason, the seriousness of
the present world situation should trigger interest in alternative
systems to readers who assess world problems realistically. A
Study of Future Worlds presents one such alternative.
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